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1 an introductory reflection 
Emotions are a part of law in general, and of criminal law more specifically. But in the 
historical interpretations of the acts and texts of past legislators, rational behaviour seems 
to get the priority. To identify the rational arguments and rationality of legislative acts 
perhaps connects with our own contemporary expectations to law and politics. This at-
titude has a complex background. As to law and legal history this attitude might have 
been seen in connection with the fact that current legal use of past legislation favours a 
rational interpretation and that the legal reconstruction of the past often is formed in or-
der to serve the present and future. Also, this might have to do with the historiography of 
modernity, which to a large extent has grouped historical causes as rational entities, like 
class, power, political need and legal structures. In analysing the historical background 
of a past legislation, there are many underlying reasons to make us believe that it was the 
rational conducts of the past that produced law. My claim is very simplified, and there 
are a number of exceptions to this line of thought. Still both as lawyers and as legal histo-
rians, we tend to look for rationality in legal history; rationality in the sense that we can 
reconstruct past legal and social processes as understandable lines of events and acts in a 
contemporary way. 
 To exchange this attitude with the opposite, that of searching for irrationality in the 
past would however be an implausible conclusion.  My sole argument in this article is to 
focus on what I would call a wider understanding of the character of rationality in the 
actions and thinking of legal pasts. First of all I would emphasise on emotions as a dimen-
sion of legal pasts, both as to legal thinking and formal legislative acts. By doing this, I 
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also respond to new contemporary concerns about the tendency to exclude emotions and 
feelings from the rationality of political actions. There is new interesting research within 
social sciences that pays attention to the fact that emotions, contrary to what would be 
expected, contribute to political rationality, and that emotions bring forth a wider set of 
arguments that are relevant for a sound political decision.1
In some way this seems obvious, and my main point then is to highlight this obvious 
aspect by bringing it into legal historical interpretations of some moments of criminal 
law reforms around the year 1800. I underline the word ‘moments’ as I have no ambition 
to carry this through in a systematic way, rather then, only to give some examples. My 
claim is not to bring forth any new historical material or pursue new lines of research, but 
only to combine this wide understanding of rationality, by including emotions and feel-
ings, with some issues of criminal reforms: I begin with the discourse on the guillotine 
during the French Revolution (1789-1793); then I continue with the concept of empathy 
in Adam Smith’s argumentation against torture (1759), before I study the Danish Kantian 
lawyer J.F.W. Schlegel’s concept of rationality as part of his understanding of public de-
bate; his arguments were made in his legal interpretation of the legislation concerning the 
freedom of the press (1797). At last I point to some examples where emotions are being 
used as an argument in the preparatory works (1832) of the new Norwegian criminal 
code of 1842.  
2 Talking heads? The problems of Joseph-ignace guillotin
So I start with the French Revolution.2 A rather prominent member of French National 
Convention of 1789 was the medical professor Joseph-Ignace Guillotin (1738-1814). As 
the debate on the reforms of criminal law began at the end of that year, in 1789, Guillotin 
outlined some principles for the future criminal reform. Firstly, he said, all crimes should 
be punished equally whatever social rank of the criminal; secondly, as the criminal is 
an individual, the family is exempted from punishment; thirdly, the law should prohibit 
confiscations. Furthermore, by capital punishment the corpse belongs to the family and 
nobody may insult a citizen who is in family with the executed; and finally, the guillotine. 
In case of capital punishment “the criminal shall be decapitated; this will be done solely 
by means of a simple mechanism.” The “mechanism” was defined as “a machine that 
beheads painlessly”. On the whole, these typical Enlightenment principles – albeit with 
a heavy weight on capital punishment – were absorbed by the French Criminal code of 
1791. 
1 Between enlightenment and disaster. Dimensions of the political use of knowledge (ed. Sangolt), Peter Lang 
International Academic Publishers 2010. 
2 For the following text on Guillotin and the capital punishment I rely solely on two major historical works: 
Arasse, The guillotine and the terror, translated by Miller, (Allen Lane 1989) and Manow, Im Schatten des 
Königs (Suhrkamp Verlag 2008). Cfr furthermore, Beccaria, On crimes and punishments (1764), Book XXI. 
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Within a short space of time the instrument now bearing Guillotin’s name was pro-
duced, (although with a number of predecessors), and there was a general consensus that 
the guillotine had solved some of the perils of uncivilised criminal law of the past.
Firstly, the individual moral burden of the executer who just then also had joined 
the ranks of citizens. Secondly, the immediate death that excluded the possibility of pro-
longed physical pain that had been an intended dimension of executions in the ancient 
regimes. Thirdly, the logic of social equality attained by the instrument of a new indus-
trialised age. In this very instrument, the structure of the late 18th Century criminal law 
was embodied: The republican constitutional concerns of equality and citizenship; the 
scientific approach to the criminal body, ending religious connotations in the old system 
of rituals; the political role, yes, the responsibility of citizens’ emotional response to the 
pains of others. I will come back to these features in a moment. 
But there were troubles ahead. In January 1793 the King was beheaded, thus opening 
up a flood of executions.3 Almost instantly – as Daniel Arasse has shown - this Enlight-
enment invention was targeted at its very heart. A medical debate began about whether 
it in fact was medically correct that death occurred immediately after the beheading or 
whether the decapitated head still was conscious, that it still, in the words of Arass, “had 
the capacity for sentiments, still had the feeling of the I of a person.” This was truly a 
nightmare for the defenders of the guillotine. If this was true, the guillotine did not pro-
duce rational egalitarian deaths. Rather it had created, again in Arass’ words, “a feeling 
head without a body, a head which only can grasp one thought: ‘I think, but I am no 
more’”. There were medical and constitutional issues at stake: Did the seat of emotions 
and consciousness sit in the head or was it divided equally around the body? The de-
bate was also a constitutional one as the defenders of the head model were monarchists 
arguing in favour of the necessity of real heads of states, whereas the defenders of the 
body model were republicans arguing against the hierarchical model and in favour of a 
democratic political body. In this manner the combining roles of science, emotions and 
constitutions were integrated in the discourses on the guillotine, and ultimately, the jus-
tifications of criminal law reform.  
3 Two natural law models: Reason and emotion
This debate presupposed a particular argumentation that had been going on since the 
mid 18th Century. By paying attention to this argumentation, I want to broaden the 
scope of my theme by focusing on two different lines of natural law theories running 
through the second half of the 18th Century. They are often being called the rationalistic 
3 Arass, The guillotine pp. 52-66. 
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and the sentimentalist one.4 Simplifying the matter somewhat here, the rationalist natural 
law theories justified moral obligations and natural law norms in an a priori way with 
a priority of reason over empirically founded facts; in the extreme version of Christian 
Wolff, the rational natural law begins with moral principles of reason and deduces from 
there what is to be the true moral judgment. On the other side, the sentimentalist version 
of, for example David Hume and the empirical tradition, employed what was called an 
experimental method. This meant doing an empirical investigation into the causes and 
processes of normative behaviour; then, identifying what they called man’s faculty of 
sympathy, which they saw as the organ that man uses to collect empirical data on which 
moral judgments are formed and elucidated. In fact then, the sentimentalist natural law 
partly justifies moral obligations in the form of analytical introspections into the inner 
self, partly through investigation of public utility. Both models of natural law imagine a 
vision of a human right-based society, but they differ as to the priority of emotions and 
a priori of reasons. 
No one followed the sentimentalist line of thought more thoroughly than Adam 
Smith in Theory of Moral Sentiment published in 1759.5 The subsequent quotation shows 
Smith going to the heart of the matter – if your moral judgment is not based upon a priori 
reasoning and you are left with the empirical world – how do you then arrive at a moral 
obligation? It seems that we may call this the law of empathy: Adam Smith opens his book 
with an analysis on the concept of sympathy. He sets out to study the mental effects of 
somebody watching a man being tortured; Smith called this observer the impartial spec-
tator:  
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the 
like situation. Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, 
our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us 
beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any concep-
tion of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than 
by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions 
of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, 
we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, 
we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, 
and then form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker 
in degree, is not altogether unlike them.
4 For what follows see in particular now Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy (Oxford University Press 
2010) pp. 5-10 and Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy (Cambridge University Press 
2010) pp. 56-71. 
5 For the following quotation, see Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (ed. Glasgow Liberty Fund 1976) 
pp. 9 sq. 
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One person is witnessing the torture of another. But what can make him a moral person 
in that situation? It is the combination of the ability to symphatise with another and then 
consolidate his or her inner moral autonomy. Both the ability to observe the sufferings 
of your brother and the ability to identify yourself with those sufferings enable you to 
legislate in the moral domain and hence form a judgment. Reason alone however, cannot 
form any moral judgment; it takes the whole body. For Smith, human rights cannot just 
be assumed to be part of human nature; it must rise from our systematic analysis of all 
the injuries inflected upon man. 
Comparing Adam Smith’s text of 1759 and Cesare Beccaria’s famous book from 1764 
brings out interesting differences. Beccaria sees the foundation of moral obligation in 
certain deductions from the social contract, whereas Smith, who did not care much 
about the idea of social contract, whether in its real or hypothetical version, resorts to the 
individual interaction with others; what we call the obligations coming out of the process 
of social intersubjectivity. On the other hand there were similarities in their tendency to 
see commitment to justice coming from the emotional sympathy with particular individ-
uals, “sympathy with the resentment felt by individual victims of injustice”.6 The differ-
ence between philosophy and science was then rather vague; perhaps therefore the two 
of them arrive at the same conclusion as to the content of natural law on torture, whether 
following the empirical method of Smith or the rational political one of Beccaria. 
In the public opinions of the late 18th century these learned debates between ratio-
nalists and sentimentalists, or those many combinations of the two, became part of new 
patterns of understandings of man in society, blending reason and emotions.7 In the late 
18th century literature, the claim that you felt morally that human rights existed could 
be based upon the ability to universalise your own empathy. That ability was seen as a 
key characteristic both as to that of being man and as to being a citizen. In literature, in 
music, in science, there was this dominant theme of the individual’s experience of being 
a moral individual: how am I morally in relation to others? This complex I-experience 
was not only reserved for the elite of society. The novel emerged around 1750 as a literary 
genre in which ordinary people’s inner life was shown, both women and men; and on the 
opera stage, maids appear with an equally rich inner life as that of counts, as in Mozart’s 
Marriage of Figaro (1786). Of course one cannot conclude anything about rights, but 
one can infer something about the conception of human nature’s inherent equality based 
upon the universal display of emotions. And without this cultural shift it is difficult to 
imagine the idea that individuals - regardless of status - could be a carrier of enforceable 
legal rights. Thus, the idea of human rights also seems to be a question of the understand-
ing of the human anthropological characteristics in terms of not only reason, but of both 
6 Frazer (2010) p. 12. 
7 See for what follows in particular Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (W. W. Norton & Company 
2007) p. 35 sq. 
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reason and emotion. As Condorcet stated in 1790: “What is the basis of the human rights, 
if not the fact that humans were feeling individuals, with the ability to assimilate moral 
ideas and to argue about these?”8 
4 J.F.W. schlegel and the limits of freedom of expression 
(1797): The judgment of reason or public opinion? 
In a slight shift of scenery I will now move the scene to Copenhagen. In 1797, the professor 
and Kantian philosopher Johan Frederik Wilhelm Schlegel published an extensive article 
on freedom of expression where he dealt both with natural law and Norwegian-Danish 
law.9 He concluded that as to both of these legal systems there were some specific limits 
for the use of freedom of expression: What fell outside that freedom was thus subject to 
criminal law. In that sense his argumentation for those limits makes up what justifies the 
criminalisation of a particular offence, being slander or revealing state secrets or what-
ever. As he was an outspoken Kantian lawyer, he took into account the Kantian model 
of natural law and moral philosophy. On the whole Kant rejected that sympathy had any 
moral value, and instead he laid emphasis on the person’s moral autonomy understood as 
rational self-control. Schlegel’s article also consisted of an interpretation of the relatively 
liberal Danish-Norwegian legislation of 1790, which opened up for a considerable degree 
of freedom of expression. The legislation itself was however not without a number of 
ambiguous points making the boundaries of expression of freedom quite liquid, which 
created a number of competing interpretations. 
Here I will focus on one particular issue. Given the fact that freedom of expression 
had some limits, the question arose how one should decide these limits. Shortly before 
the publication of Schlegel’s text, a well known author, Michael Gottlieb Birckner (1756- 
1798), had maintained that cases involving freedom of expression should be laid open to 
the verdict of the public opinion, and not to be subject to legal proceedings in court. The 
public opinion, he said, was more reasonable and unbiased than the rulings of the court, 
as the public opinion constituted itself in complex social processes allowing attacks and 
counterattacks. To Schlegel however, this was to abandon rationality in the public do-
main. In a Kantian vocabulary, he stressed that the formation of public opinions always 
would be dominated by passions of the crowds, which were irrational and dangerous, 
there were experiences from the French Revolution to draw on. Thus only the authority 
8 The argument was set forth in favor of political rights for women in De ’admission des femmes au droit de 
cité (1790), cfr. Willams, Condorcet and Modernity (Cambridge University Press 2004) pp. 158 sq. 
9 For what follows: Schlegel, ”Erindringer imod Hr. Birckners Skrift: om Trykkefriheden og dens Love; til-
lige med et Forsøg paa at bestemme Grændseskiellet imellem Trykkefrihed og Trykkefrækhed” in Astræa 
1 (1797) pp. 345-488 cfr. Michalsen, ”’Grændseskillet imellem Trykkefrihed og Trykkefrækhet’ – Johan 
Frederik Wilhelm Schlegel, Astræa og trykkefrihetens grenser” in Demokratisk teori og historisk praksis (ed. 
Sandvik), Spartacus/Scandinavian Academic Press 2010 pp. 197-221. 
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of the court would ensure that it was the judicialisation of man’s freedom that would 
secure the unfolding of rationality in society. Public opinion could never attain the ra-
tionality of the court and hence it was unacceptable to leave the boundaries of law to 
the self-regulating mechanism of public opinion. In particular, in cases of slander and 
defamation, the public opinion was not capable of protecting the border of rationality in 
a public debate. 
So what was at stake here? Around 1800 the field of science is dominated by the accel-
erating process of ‘scientification’ of science, in particular the Kantian and post Kantian 
models of science. This was also the case of legal science with its emphasis on notions of 
necessary connections and systematic entities. To Schlegel this is shown in the particular 
concurrence between what is scientifically and constitutional valid. Here the legal expert 
speaks the voice of both science and reason. The two categories of justifications are here 
much more intertwined than as usually presented: What was constitutionally correct was 
almost by definition scientifically acceptable. The exclusion of emotions is combined with 
the inclusion of the court, paralleling the Kantian notion of law as abstract and rational. 
The law of empathy could only exist as far as the general principles of reason would allow. 
But the very existence of this law also makes clear the boundaries of rationality.  
5 Types of arguments in the preparatory work 
of norwegian criminal law, 1835 
Leaving the 18th century and entering the world of early 19th century Norwegian crimi-
nal legal thinking, some of the effects of these discourses become apparent. The historical 
source for what follows is the preparatory work of the Norwegian criminal law code of 
1842, published in 1835. This 1835-text was written by two legal experts, Jørgen Herman 
Vogt (1784-1862) and Jens Christian Berg (1775-1852), both being educated in the Co-
penhagen Enlightenment spirit;10 Berg was moreover a kind of pupil of Schlegel. Here I 
just want to draw attention to the pattern of argumentation concerning corporal punish-
ment; once again I am interested in the blending of emotions, science and reason; the last 
concept covering both reason as an argument, and more specifically, reason in the form 
of a constitutional argument. 
In accordance with the trends of European modern criminal laws of the 1830s, the law 
committee proposed abolition of corporal punishment.11 Given the fact that they build 
their criminal theory upon a vague combination of deterrence and rehabilitation, one ex-
pects some references to more or less scientific arguments about the causal relationships 
between punishment and social action. A dominating feature however is how assump-
10 For what follows: Motiver til det i Aaret 1832 udgivne Forslag til en Lov for Kongeriget Norge angaaende 
Forbrydelser (1835). Cfr. Michalsen 2010. 
11 Motiver (1835) pp. 20 sq. 
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tions of that kind are being absorbed by arguments based upon reason and constitutional 
conjectures. One example is the division of criminal offenders as either morally sound or 
morally decayed; on that basis, corporal punishment is being analysed as having terrible 
consequences for the morally sound, but no consequences for the decayed.  In addition 
to this rather vague scientific assumption, the committee showed a general scepticism as 
to the effect of corporal punishment on the basis that it was contrary to constitutional 
historical assumptions like ‘progress of culture’. 
Eventually there were emotional-scientific arguments, which were evident in their 
argumentation in favour of capital punishment. As those countries that had abolished 
capital punishment, like Russia, Austria, and the U.S. state of Louisiana, at the same time 
had introduced heavy corporal punishments, such as rigid isolation or even physical in-
flictions. The dilemma that arose for the committee was whether capital punishment or 
punishment in form of imprisonment and corporal punishment was to be chosen:  The 
answer was structured by reason and emotion: “Such punishments that are offensive to 
humanity, will not be tolerated in Norway”. In the option between torturous sufferings 
and capital punishment, the last was by far to be preferred, as sufferings “shudder our 
feelings to such a degree that they cannot be proposed in our age”.12 But the option of cap-
ital punishment was, they maintained, simple and clear. And – in the spirit of Guillotine, 
the execution was to be fulfilled according to “Humanity … and with no unnecessary 
increase of pain”.13  
6 conclusion 
My main aim has been to say the obvious: that the modes of justifications of criminal law 
reforms in the decades around 1800 consisted of a blend of constitutional, rational-scien-
tific and emotional arguments. One possible explanation for this blending is the double 
foundation of natural law theories, namely the rational and the sentimental. Regarding 
both of the models, the connection to science was a flexible one, as science itself is. A 
more systematic research into the emotional side of the argumentation in legal discours-
es in general, and in criminal law more specifically, might reveal the subtle strategies 
of arguments reflecting the ineradicable factor of feelings and emotions purified in the 
language of science. 
12 Motiver (1835) p. 28. 
13 Motiver (1835) p. 30.
